What is secure boot windows 8.1




















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Now it's supported by an industry consortium. UEFI in essence, is a light-weight operating system, written primarily in C language, that the computer loads at boot time. Being an operating system, UEFI interfaces the computer hardware as a virtual platform for running firmware programs.

A BIOS is the very first program that is executed once the system is switched on. The function of the BIOS program is to control the hardware platform till it identifies and executes the Bootloader program. The ROM acts as a storage device for firmware programs to reside in a passive state and gets activated when they are loaded copied into memory for execution by the processor.

In the system initialisation state, when memory is not ready for use, the processor executes the first codes directly from the ROM and this ends with an instruction to copy the ROM codes into memory RAM.

Normally the processor executes instructions sequentially from the logical memory. A memory reference in an instruction is used to access a subroutine on a device ROM Or transfer program control to another location in the RAM. The following table tries to depict the typical memory utilisation of BIOS as it reached towards its end-of-life phase.

When a system is switched on, the system memory RAM is empty and therefore the processor doesn't really have anything to execute.

This is followed by a second Jump instruction to shift the program execution to a location in the RAM. At this stage, the processor checks for an user control signal interrupt sent via the keyboard which sets a flag indicating a request for change of the BIOS Configuration.

The final phase of the BIOS program is to identify the Boot device from a list of boot devices, defined in descending order of priority in the boot configuration. MBR contains three pieces of information: the master partition table, the disk signature, and the master boot code. BIOS transfers program control to the memory location C00h and the master boot code executes, which locates the active boot partition from data in the master partition table, and loads into memory the Bootloader program NTLDR of the OS.

A new OS installation will be required. The BIOS is essentially a set of platform instructions routine in bit assembly language of the processor, whereas UEFI is an Operating System that accomplishes the platform tasks through bit programs in the C-language which is far more efficient than the BIOS routine. The UEFI firmware is platform independent, and so device drivers are required to have standard commands to communicate with the device controller.

The device controller electronics is responsible for translating these commands into input signals in the native format of the device. This makes it possible to test and develop standard drivers and applications irrespective of the implementation. This enables a driver to be universal type for a specific hardware, reduces the complexity of supporting new hardware, and helps computer manufacturers update and maintain firmware more rapidly.

Fast boot is actually due to partial hibernation of the User session when Fast start-up is enabled in Windows 8, 10 under Power Options in Control Panel. The Bootloader in the ESP is fully concealed and isolated from access by programs running during OS runtime, thus securing the Bootloader against malware attacks.

This makes it possible to include at the firmware level, almost any other service that is possible by the main OS. Unlike an elaborate anti-malware application, Secure Boot is a simple safety measure designed for the UEFI firmware environment. Although functionally simple, it mandates some stringent compliance from all third party hardware devices and programs that must hook to the Platform Firmware.

To remain flexible, Secure Boot is provided as an optional feature that can be enabled in UEFI and this is the topic of discussion in the next section.

In the days of bit Windows 3. The Boot Mode is used to boot an OS; the Setup Mode is used to configure the boot and other firmware settings and the Update Mode is used to update the firmware version.

In the User Mode, the EFI shell is called by an user to run firmware commands and other utility programs. The primary objective of these bootable CDs was to provide a repair environment in case of a System breakdown.

However the EFI shell can be additionally used to install and run customised diagnostic and firmware programs. The UEFI has implemented a Security System during boot, called "Secure Boot" which essentially comes to securing the firmware components in the boot process with a digital signature that the platform validates with a trusted key. In most PCs today, the firmware environment is vulnerable to malware function during boot, when the original MBR bootloader has been replaced with a malicious loader called Bootkit.

Bootkits own higher privileges than the OS since it has to load the OS, and thus gains the ability to manipulate the operating system and its security measures from controlling them. Bootkits gets installed through a vulnerability in the OS or in disguise through an apparently genuine software program.

Once installed they are very difficult to detect, unless they engage in disruptive activities. They mostly work as spywares collecting user information. In Windows XP, the function of the BIOS is to transfer control of the platform firmware to the Bootloader of the OS by executing the Master Boot Record MBR , which is a small program located in the first sector of the computer hard disc that tells the computer how the hard drive is partitioned, and how to load the operating system.

The MBR is susceptible to boot sector viruses that can corrupt or remove the MBR, which can leave the hard drive unusable and prevent the computer from booting up. Windows 7 confines the Bootloader program files in the first partition of the of the Hard Disc called "System Reserved" - a MB primary active partition automatically created by system at the time of Windows 7 installation. The Bootloader files in this system partition are fully concealed and isolated, thus eliminating the chances of corruption by malware.

Windows 8 further extends the secure boot implementation of Windows 7, using trusted keys in Boot Manager to ensure that only properly signed and authenticated components are allowed to execute. In addition, firmware access is limited to user control without any programmatic interface. The Secure Boot process is owned by vendors who are certified by UEFI to digitally sign their firmware files images which forms part of the firmware system.

These trusted vendors share their trust key with the principal trust owner of the platform, generally represented by the OEM, who has to authenticate the digital signature on every image with its trust key, before allowing them to execute. Secure Boot is localised in the UEFI firmware environment, from the ROM which being write protected acts as a safety device for the resident firmware to execute freely without authentication, to locations outside the ROM where the signature of all firmware images are authenticated before allowing them to activate.

Secure Boot ends with the loading of a certified Bootloader of the OS into memory. Trusted Boot takes over from where Secure Boot leaves off, to manage the booting of Windows components using trusted certificates. At the point when Windows needs to load third party device drivers, Trusted Boot launches the Anti-Malware driver and hands over the task of malware identification to the Anti-Malware system. Windows 8 has prioritised the loading sequence of its Anti-Malware program so that it loads before any device drivers where rootkits are located.

Regardless of whether you are using Windows Defender or a different anti-malware product, Windows 8 has tweaked its load process so that security software runs first. By being launched first before any third-party driver, ELAM is able to detect malware in the boot process and prevent it from initializing. UEFI is a community effort by many companies in the personal-computer industry to upgrade the pre-OS environment.

The forum is responsible for developing, managing and promoting UEFI specifications. Microsoft is a board member of this forum, and the forum is open to any individual or company to join free of cost. The private key is secret to the owner of the keys, and the Public Key is distributed openly.

The purpose of PKE is to render confidentiality to a message by encrypting it with the public key and then sending it to a recipient via an open channel, who can only decrypt the message using the secret private key.

The purpose of a Digital Signature is to authenticate a software object by encrypting it with the owner's private key and enclosing the public key for ready decryption of the object, and openly distributed where confidentiality is not the requirement.

In actual practice, the unencrypted object is accompanied by its digital signature which is decoded at the receiving end and compared with the unencrypted object for a veracity check. However encrypting an entire object produces an unduly large Digital Signature which is therefore reduced by a hash function. A hash is a complex algorithm which produces a unique ID from the binary of a software object.

The purpose of the hash is to prove the integrity to a software object. A hash of an object's binary is further encrypted and used as a digital signature to accompany the original unencrypted object. The receiver receives the unencrypted object and the digital signature enclosed by its public key and the hash function.

The receiver uses the public key to unencrypt the signature and retrieve the hash; it then uses the hash function to derive the hash of the received unencrypted object.

These two hashes if found identical, confirms the identity and the integrity of the received object. This entity is the owner of a Trust Key pair that enables the root of trust on the platform and acts as the primal trust anchor from which the secure boot trust chain in built. The owner is responsible to digitally sign the firmware files images in the first stage boot process located in UEFI motherboard OptionROMs with its private key.

Platform security is enforced by PK which validates the digital signature of each image, before allowing them to execute. The PK thus provides the foundation from which the authenticated boot process is built.

KEK database is comprised of vendors who provide the second stage trust anchors in the secure boot chain. Only PK is authorised to write the vendor's digital certificate into KEK, which acts as a reference for validating the vendor credential presented during the boot process. Vendors who are defined in the KEK are allowed to write to the Allowed Signature db database and Forbidden database dbx. Like the platform security owner, these vendors maintain a pair of trust keys called Vendor's Production CA, of which the private key is used to sign its firmware images and the public key is provided in the Authorised Database db to authenticate the firmware images at run time.

A trust chain is established where the root trust holder PK loads trusted vendors in KEK, and the KEK vendors loads trusted firmware images authenticated by the Allowed Signature db database. Thus PK in effect have a trust relationship with the images in db, and alongwith the images that is directly signed by it, PK reposes its trust on the entire set of firmware images that is part of the Secure Boot process.

There lies a catch however. Follow 2 steps below to make your computer secure boot disabled or enabled. And if you are locked out of PCs, the 4th method is better for you. Click the Power icon on login screen. Hold on Shift key on computer keyboard and click Restart button on login screen. But usually you can find it under " Boot ", " Security " or " Authentication " menu and change its value.

Note: If no "Security" tab, select "System Configuration" instead. And directly disable secure boot under it. When Secure Boot Configuration warning appears, press F10 to continue.

Use up and down arrow keys to select Secure Boot.



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